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JOYNER V. FORSYTH COUNTY BOARD OF
COMMISSIONERS:
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF SECTARIAN
LEGISLATIVE PRAYER
KATHERINE LEWIS PARKER
I. INTRODUCTION
At approximately 7:30 p.m. on a December evening in 2007, the
Forsyth County, North Carolina Board of Commissioners convened their
regular monthly public board meeting.' As had been the practice for
years, the Chair of the Board called a religious leader from the
community to the podium to give the opening invocation on behalf of the
2Board. As Chair Gloria Whisenhunt called Pastor Robert Hutchens to
the podium, she asked the members of the public in the audience to
stand. Pastor Hutchens began:
.Ms. Parker, Legal Director for the American Civil Liberties Union of North
Carolina Legal Foundation, served as lead counsel for the Plaintiffs in Joyner v.
Forsyth County. As Legal Director of the ACLU-NCLF, she is past-chair of the
Civil Rights Section of the North Carolina Advocates for Justice, as well as the
Constitutional Rights and Responsibilities Section Council of the North Carolina Bar
Association. She is also a member of the Board of Directors for North Carolina
Prisoner Legal Services. Before joining the ACLU-NCLF, Ms. Parker worked for
five years for the law firm of Holland & Knight in Tallahassee and Jacksonville,
Florida, as a Media and Commercial Litigation Associate. Ms. Parker is a cum laude
graduate of the University of Georgia for both her undergraduate degree and her law
degree. During law school, her law review Note, "Fit to Be Tied? Fourth
Amendment Analysis of the Hog-Tie Restraint Procedure," was published in the
Georgia Law Review. After law school, Ms. Parker clerked for the Honorable John
F. Nangle, United States District Judge for the Southern District of Georgia.
1. Joyner v. Forsyth Cnty., 653 F.3d 341, 342 (4th Cir. 2011).
2. Joint Appendix for Fourth Circuit Appeal at 150 42, 479, Joyner, 653 F.3d
341 (No. 10-1232) (audio CDs on file with author), available at www.pacer.gov
[hereinafter Joint Appendix].
3. Id.
3052012] SECTARIAN LEGISLATIVE PRAYER
Before we pray, I would like to say my
appreciation to the ones that serve here on the
Board. I'm a lifelong resident of Forsyth County,
grew up in Lewisville, lived in Winston-Salem, and
the last two years, I live [sic] in Kernersville, and I
appreciate your service to me and also the stand
the Board took as a whole allowing me, a minister
of the Gospel of the Lord Jesus Christ, to be able to
pray as the New Testament instructs. And I
appreciate that.
May we pray. Heavenly Father, tonight we are so
grateful for the privilege to pray that is made
possible by Your Son and His intercessory work on
the Cross of Calvary. And Lord, we think about
even a week from tomorrow, Lord, we'll remember
that Virgin Birth, and how He was born to die. And
we're so grateful tonight that we can look in the
Bible and see how You instituted government. And
it's even ordained by You tonight that these
Commissioners will gather here tonight and
conduct the business of this County. And we
certainly, tonight, want to remember to pray for
wisdom for each of them. For Mrs. Whisenhunt, as
she chairs the Board, and each member that
tonight, they would humbly look to Thee for
guidance and for divine intervention in these
matters. And each issue that's on the agenda
tonight, we pray that it would be handled carefully,
with much thought and wisdom, Lord, as to what
You would have them do.
As not only citizens of this County, but of this
great country, Lord, we do want to remember our
President tonight, and our Congress, Lord, and pray
that all three branches of our government would be
led by Thee. And that we would continue to stand
with Your chosen people-the people of Israel.
And Lord, we think about our military, serving
around the world, not only in Iraq and Afghanistan,
but military personnel all over the globe, away
from their families at this time of year. We pray
that You would be with them, and put a hedge of
protection about them. And Lord, continue to be
with this City and this County. Lord, protect us
from crime and influences of evil, Lord, that we
know would hinder the citizens. And we remember
on a cold night like tonight those that are homeless
and those in need here in our County.
And again, we humbly ask You to guide our
Commissioners tonight. For we do make this
prayer in Your Son Jesus' name, Amen.4
Two long-time Winston-Salem residents and retirees, Janet
Joyner and Connie Blackmon, were in the audience that night. Ms.
Joyner and Ms. Blackmon, who regularly attended County Commission
meetings to address and follow matters of local importance, previously
and repeatedly objected to the County about the prevalence of sectarian
5
references in the board's opening prayers. The overtly sectarian nature
of Pastor Hutchens's prayer, like the other sectarian references to which
they have been subjected at Board meetings, made Ms. Joyner and Ms.
Blackmon feel not only unwelcome and offended in a government
meeting, but also "compelled" and "coerced" by their government into
accepting Christianity.6  Yet, despite the overtly sectarian and
proselytizing prayer given by Pastor Hutchens at the December 17, 2007,
meeting, the County invited him to return as an official prayer-giver on
7
December 15, 2008, when he again offered a sectarian prayer.
On July 29, 2011, in Joyner v. Forsyth County,8 the Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with Ms. Joyner and Ms. Blackmon,
concluding that Forsyth County's prayer policy and practice crossed the
4. Id. at 121-22, 479; Joyner, 653 F.3d at 342.
5. Joyner, 653 F.3d at 342-43; Joint Appendix, supra note 2, at 3.
6. Joyner, 653 F.3d at 345; Joint Appendix, supra note 2, at 124-25 Jl 10-14,
127 1 9, 181, 183-85, 253-55 ("1 found ... the invocation to be even worse than
anything I had ever heard . . . in terms of its offensiveness.").
7. Joint Appendix, supra note 2, at 312, 479.
8. 653 F.3d 341 (4th Cir. 2011).
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constitutional line and unconstitutionally advanced Christianity in
violation of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment to the
United States Constitution.9 The Fourth Circuit's decision upheld a
January of 2010 ruling by U.S. District Chief Judge James Beaty of the
Middle District of North Carolina that the Forsyth County prayer policy
violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.10 The Fourth
Circuit decision also upheld Judge Beaty's order that the County must
end or change its current prayer policy."
Writing the 2-1 majority opinion, Judge J. Harvie Wilkinson III
explained that the Fourth Circuit's decisions on legislative prayer, as
well as decisions of the United States Supreme Court, "approv[e]
legislative prayer only when it is nonsectarian in both policy and
practice."I2 On January 17, 2012, the United States Supreme Court
denied the County's petition for a writ of certiorari.13
This article will discuss the Joyner v. Forsyth County Board of
Commissioners case, and the constitutionality of sectarian legislative
prayer in general.
II. BACKGROUND FACTS
The Forsyth County Board of Commissioners typically holds
public meetings twice per month.14 The Board opens each meeting with a
prayer, which, per the Board's longstanding practice, is delivered by an
invited clergy member. During the prayers, members of the audience
customarily stand, at the request of the Board Chair, and bow their
heads.16 With a few exceptions, the prayers usually refer explicitly to
"Jesus Christ." 7 The Board maintained this prayer practice for years
9. Id. at 349.
10. Id. at 345.
11. Id. at 355.
12. Id. at 348.
13. See Forsyth Cnty. v. Joyner, No. 11-546, 2012 WL 117559 (Jan. 17, 2012).
14. Joyner, 653 F.3d at 343.
15. Id.; Joint Appendix, supra note 2, at 143 10, 284-85.
16. Joyner, 653 F.3d at 343; Joint Appendix, supra note 2, at 126 4, 127 5.
17. Joyner, 653 F.3d at 343; Joint Appendix, supra note 2, at 479.
307
308 FIRST AMENDMENT LAW REVIEW rVol. 10
without any written policy.' On March 30, 2007, after several
unsuccessful requests that the Board modify its invocation practice to
permit only non-sectarian prayer, the American Civil Liberties Union of
North Carolina and the Winston-Salem Chapter of Americans United for
Separation of Church and State, on behalf of Ms. Joyner and Ms.
Blackmon, filed a lawsuit in the federal court for the Middle District of
North Carolina, challenging the constitutionality of the Board's
unwritten policy and practice of repeatedly sponsoring sectarian prayer.19
On May 14, 2007, the Board adopted the proposed "Policy
Regarding Opening Invocations Before Meetings of the Forsyth County
Board of Commissioners" ("Policy"). 20 The Policy codified the Board's
previously unwritten practice of authorizing invited clergy members to
open the Board's public meetings with sectarian prayer for the purported
purpose of "solemnizing its proceedings.",21
A. Selecting Prayer-Givers
Under the Policy, the Forsyth County Board of Commissioners
was required to recruit, "select[]," and then assign prayer-givers for each
meeting.22 Only clergy affiliated with a local congregation could serve as
prayer-givers.23 To reach these clergy, the Policy directed the Board's
Clerk, as part of his or her official duties, to expend County time and
resources "compil[ing] and maintain[ing] a database (the 'Congregations
List') of the religious congregations with an established presence in the
local community of Forsyth County." 24 The Clerk then mailed invitations
addressed to the "religious leader" of each congregation on the
25Congregations List on or about December 1st of each calendar year.
18. Joyner, 653 F.3d at 343; Joint Appendix, supra note 2, at 143 1 12, 188-
89, 284-85.
19. Joyner, 653 F.3d at 343-44; Joint Appendix, supra note 2, at 2-29, 145
24, 275-76 (discussing unwritten policy).
20. Joyner, 653 F.3d at 344; Joint Appendix, supra note 2, at 165-71.
21. Joyner, 653 F.3d at 344; Joint Appendix, supra note 2, at 143 $T 11-12,
165-71,275-76, 290-91.
22. Joint Appendix, supra note 2, at 169 114, 281-82.
23. Id at 169 T 4.
24. Id
25. Id.
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Those who responded were scheduled by the Clerk on a "first-come,
first-serve[d] basis." 2 6 In total, employees in the Clerk's office spent
between thirty minutes to five hours each week securing a prayer-giver
for each meeting.27
Though the Clerk updated the Congregations List each
November, currently at least 95% (more than 600 out of 635) of the
churches and religious leaders on the Congregations List were identified
on the list as being affiliated with a Christian denomination or as non-
28denominational Christian. Importantly, the Clerk had not secured a
single non-Christian prayer-giver to deliver the invocation after the
Policy's adoption through the date of the injunction in November of
2009.29 Moreover, not every citizen who requested access was permitted
to give the opening invocation at Board meetings. Nor was everyone
who requested access included on the Congregations List.31 Rather, the
Policy's requirement that the prayer-giver only be a religious leader from
an established congregation excluded many belief systems and
individuals in the county.3 2
B. Delivery ofPrayers
Prayers conducted under the written Policy operated in much the
same way they did before the Policy was adopted. 3 3 Although the Policy
stated that invocations would be delivered before meetings and were
intended for the benefit of Board members only, in practice, the prayers
took place after the meeting officially began, they were addressed to and
involved the audience, and they were included as part of the official
26. Id. at 170.
27. Id. at 229; see also Joyner v. Forsyth Cnty., 653 F.3d 341, 343 (4th Cir.
2011) (describing the process); Joint Appendix, supra note 2, at 147-49 T 34, 169
4, 207 (describing the process).
28. See Joint Appendix, supra note 2, at 147-49 34, 169 T 4, 231 (discussing
the policy of updating lists), 651-99 (listing potential prayer-givers).
29. Joyner, 653 F.3d at 353; see also Joint Appendix, supra note 2, at 479,
651-99, 854-56 (providing lists of possible prayer-givers and of those prayer-givers
who participated in the meetings).
30. Joint Appendix, supra note 2, at 201-05.
3 1. Id.
32. Id. at 201-206, 217-18, 353-55.
33. See Joyner, 653 F.3d at 344.
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recording of the County's meetings.34 Indeed, although the Policy
expressly required that the "prayer shall not be listed or recognized as an
agenda item," 35 the agenda displayed at meetings-a different version
than the one posted in advance on the County's website-listed the name
of the prayer-giver and the church that he or she represented.36 This
version of the agenda was enlarged and projected onto a screen so that
"everyone . . . in the audience [could] see."n
Consistent with the displayed agenda, the prayers occurred after
the Board and audience formally gathered for the public meetings, at
around "7:31" p.m. or "two" p.m.-a few minutes after the meetings'
official 7:30 p.m. start time.38 The Board Chair called the invited clergy
member to the podium, and then, facing the audience, the Chair asked
those present to stand for the invocation and the Pledge of Allegiance.39
Using a microphone provided by the Board, the clergy member then gave
the invocation while the standing Commissioners and audience members
bowed their heads.4 0 The prayer typically began with a call to action,
such as "Let us pray," "Please pray with me," "Let us bow," "Join me as
we pray together," or "Let us bow our heads in prayer," directed at the
Board and the public in attendance. 4 1 During the invocation, only the
invited prayer-giver could address the audience; an uninvited person
attempting to speak into the microphone would have been asked to wait
42
until the public comment period.
34. Joint Appendix, supra note 2, at 269, 479.
35. Id. at 169 12.
36. See id. at 195-98.
37. See id at 146 1 29, 169 1 1-2, 195-99, 220-22 232-36, 298-99, 311-12
(discussing the board's practice of placing the information of the prayer-giver on the
projection screen).
38. Id. at 210-11.
39. Joyner v. Forsyth Cnty., 653 F.3d 341, 343 (4th Cir. 2011); Joint
Appendix, supra note 2, at 211-12.
40. Joint Appendix, supra note 2, at 127 5.
41. See id. at 127 115, 143-44 T 14-16, 248, 479.
42. Id. at 206, 286, 299-300 (noting that "security may ask you to take a
seat").
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C. The Invocation's Content
The Board had a long history of authorizing sectarian prayer at
its meetings: From November, 2003 through May 14, 2007,
approximately 68% of the invocations offered at Board meetings were
sectarian; and 100% of those sectarian prayers were decidedly Christian
in that they repeatedly invoked Jesus Christ.43 This practice of permitting
sectarian prayers continued under the Board's written Policy.44 Indeed,
the Policy banned the Commissioners from barring such prayers,
providing that "[n]either the Board nor the [Board's] Clerk shall engage
in any prior inquiry, review of, or involvement in, the content of any
prayer to be offered by an invocational speaker." 45 As a result, sectarian
prayer became even more prevalent at Board meetings after the Policy
was enacted: nearly 80% of the prayers delivered at Board meetings
between May 14, 2007 and December 15, 2008, were sectarian, all
referring to one particular deity-Jesus Christ.46 Specifically, out of
thirty-three post-Policy prayers, at least twenty-six (or approximately
79%) were sectarian.47
D. The Board's Meeting on December 17, 2007
Both Ms. Joyner and Ms. Blackmon attended the Board meeting
on December 17, 2007, at which Pastor Hutchens offered the prayer set
forth earlier in this article.48 MS. Joyner was interested in the Board's
discussion and decision on one of the agenda items and intended to speak
on the matter during the Public Hearing portion of the meeting. 49 Most of
the audience and the Board stood for the invocation and bowed. their
heads.50 As a result of Whisenhunt's direction, as well as the audience's
response, Ms. Joyner and Ms. Blackmon felt compelled to stand for the
43. Id. at 60-61, 63, 479.
44. Joyner, 653 F.3d at 344.
45. Id.; Joint Appendix, supra note 2, at 146 128, 151 1 50, 170 T 7.
46. Joyner, 653 F.3d at 344.
47. Id.; Joint Appendix, supra note 2, at 479.
48. See supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text.
49. Joyner, 653 F.3d at 344; Joint Appendix, supra note 2, at 123-25 2-14,
126-27 IN 2-10, 253-55.
50. Joint Appendix, supra note 2, at 254.
311
FIRST AMENDMENT LAW REVIEW
invocation and bow their heads, and did stand. As Ms. Blackmon was
struggling with whether to bow her head in order to conform, she noticed
that another audience member turned around and looked at Ms. Joyner
52
and Ms. Blackmon during the invocation. Ms. Blackmon felt compelled
53
and coerced to bow her head, even though she preferred not to do so.
As noted above, the sectarian nature of Pastor Hutchens's prayer made
Ms. Joyner and Ms. Blackmon feel not only unwelcome and offended in
a government meeting, but also "compelled" and "coerced" by their
government into accepting Christianity.5 4 Yet, despite that overtly
sectarian prayer, the County invited Pastor Hutchens to return as an
official prayer-giver on December 15, 2008, when he again offered a
55
sectarian prayer.
III. ANALYSIS
On July 29, 2011, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the Middle District
of North Carolina's ruling that the Forsyth County Board of
Commissioners' prayer policy "violate[d] the Establishment Clause by
advancing and endorsing Christianity to the exclusion of other faiths."56
Judge Wilkinson, writing for the majority, concluded:
The district court's ruling accords with both
Supreme Court precedent and our own. Those
cases establish that in order to survive
constitutional scrutiny, invocations must consist of
the type of nonsectarian prayers that solemnize the
legislative task and seek to unite rather than divide.
Sectarian prayers must not serve as the gateway to
citizen participation in the affairs of local
government. To have them do so runs afoul of the
promise of public neutrality among faiths that
51. Joyner, 653 F.3d at 344-45; Joint Appendix, supra note 2, at 124 6-8,
12716, 184, 254-55.
52. Joint Appendix, supra note 2, at 124 7.
53. Id. at T 6-8.
54. Joyner, 653 F.3d at 345; Joint Appendix, supra note 2, at 124-25 10-14,
127 9, 181, 183-85,253-55.
55. Joint Appendix, supra note 2, at 312, 479.
56. Joyner, 653 F.3d at 342.
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resides at the heart of the First Amendment's
religion clauses.
In arriving at this decision, the Court explained that this case is not one
"about the Establishment Clause in general, but about legislative prayer
in particular." The Court called this distinction "critical."59
A. Marsh v. Chambers and Legislative Prayer
The United States Supreme Court established in Marsh v.
Chambers60 that the Establishment Clause permits a legislative body to
invoke divine guidance before engaging in public business. 6 1 The Fourth
Circuit has repeatedly confirmed that Marsh provides the applicable
standard for testing the constitutionality of legislative prayers, rather than
the standard Establishment Clause test set forth in Lemon v. Kurtzman.62
The Fourth Circuit explained that "Marsh, in short, has made legislative
prayer a field of Establishment Clause jurisprudence with its own set of
boundaries and guidelines." 6 3  Thus, "'the mainline body of
Establishment Clause case law provides little guidance"' in legislative
64prayer cases.
However, under Marsh, the practice of legislative prayer is not
without limits.65 The Supreme Court's subsequent decision in Allegheny
County v. ACLU,66 clarified its holding in Marsh. Allegheny explained
that the prayers in Marsh did not "have the effect of affiliating the
57. Id at 342-43.
58. Id. at 345.
59. Id.
60. 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
61. Id. at 792.
62. 403 U.S. 602 (1971). See also Simpson v. Chesterfield Cnty. Bd. of
Supervisors, 404 F.3d 276, 280-81 (4th Cir. 2005).
63. Simpson, 404 F.3d at 281.
64. Id. (quoting Snyder v. Murray City Corp., 159 F.3d 1227, 1232 (10th Cir.
1998)).
65. See Allegheny Cnty. v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 603-04 (1989).
66. Id
67. See id. (noting that "Marsh plainly does not stand for the sweeping
proposition . . . that all accepted practices 200 years old and their equivalents are
constitutional today").
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government with any one specific faith or belief . . . because the
particular chaplain had 'removed all references to Christ."' 6 8
Allegheny instructs:
The history of this Nation, it is perhaps sad to say,
contains numerous examples of official acts that
endorsed Christianity specifically. Some of these
examples date back to the Founding of the
Republic, but this heritage of official
discrimination against non-Christians has no place
in the jurisprudence of the Establishment Clause.
Whatever else the Establishment Clause may
mean... it certainly means at the very least that
government may not demonstrate a preference for
one particular sect or creed (including a preference
for Christianity over other religions).69
The Allegheny decision underscores the conclusion that only
nonsectarian legislative prayer is permissible under the Establishment
Clause.
1. The Fourth Circuit's Interpretation of Marsh v. Chambers
a. Wynne v. Town of Great Falls
According to the Fourth Circuit, legislative prayer is only
permissible "when it is nonsectarian in both policy and practice."70 This
idea was first set forth in Wynne v. Town of Great Falls,7 1 in which the
Fourth Circuit held that the legislative prayers in question in that case
violated the Establishment Clause because the prayers "'frequently'
68. Id. at 603 (quoting Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 793 (1983)).
69. Id. at 604-05. The Court distinguishes the "specifically Christian" symbol
in Allegheny from the "more general religious references, like the legislative prayers
in Marsh" and notes that "however history may affect the constitutionality of
nonsectarian references to religion by the government, history cannot legitimate
practices that demonstrate the government's allegiance to a particular sect or creed."
Id. at 603.
70. Joyner v. Forsyth Cnty., 653 F.3d 341, 348 (4th Cir. 2011).
71. 376 F.3d 292 (4th Cir. 2004).
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contained references to 'Jesus Christ' and thus promoted one religion
over all others, dividing the Town's citizens along denominational
lines. ,72
In Wynne, a town citizen who was Wiccan brought suit to
prohibit the town "from engaging in prayers that specifically invoke[d]
Jesus Christ during monthly council meetings." 73 Prior to bringing suit,
the plaintiff had formally lodged an objection at a council meeting
regarding the practice of referring to Jesus in legislative prayers.74 The
plaintiff requested "that the prayer's references be limited to 'God' or,
instead, that members of different religions be invited to give prayers." 75
The Mayor refused to take plaintiffs suggestion, and plaintiff was
subjected to significant harassment and ostracism, both by the
townspeople and by the town council itself, as a result of her opposition
76to the sectarian prayers. The district court granted judgment to plaintiff
after a bench trial, finding that the town had violated the Establishment
Clause and permanently enjoining the town council "from invoking the
name of a specific deity associated with any one specific faith or belief in
prayers given at Town Council meetings."7 7 The Fourth Circuit
affirmed.
In distinguishing the unconstitutional prayers in Wynne from the
constitutional prayers in Marsh, the Fourth Circuit noted that "[i]n
Marsh, the approved prayer was characterized as 'nonsectarian' and
'civil'; indeed, the chaplain had affirmatively 'removed all references to
Christ.",79 In contrast, the prayers in Wynne "crossed [the] line," by
"'exploit[ing]' the 'prayer opportunity"' to affiliate the Government with
one specific faith or belief in preference to others.80
The Fourth Circuit in Wynne stressed the importance of
distinguishing between sectarian and nonsectarian legislative prayer by
72. Id. at 298-99.
73. Id. at 294.
74. Id. at 295.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 294-96.
77. Id. at 296.
78. Id. at 302.
79. Id. at 298 (citing Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 793 n.14 (1983)).
80. Id. (quoting Marsh, 463 U.S. at 794).
315
316 FIRST AMENDMENT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 10
citing to language from both the Marsh and Allegheny cases.81 The
Wynne court noted that Marsh emphasized that the legislative prayer at
issue there did not attempt "'to proselytize or advance any one, or to
disparage any other, faith or belief."82 The Wynne court then cited to
Allegheny, decided six years after Marsh, and stated that the Court in
Allegheny "explained that Marsh 'recognized that not even the 'unique
history' of legislative prayer can justify contemporary legislative prayers
that have the effect of affiliating the government with any one specific
faith or belief."' 83 Rather, "while Marsh may have found that history can
'affect the constitutionality of nonsectarian references to religion by the
government,' the Court had never held that 'history can[] legitimate
practices that demonstrate the government's allegiance to a particular
sect or creed."'84 The Wynne court emphasized that "the Allegheny Court
clarified that it only upheld the prayer in Marsh against Establishment
Clause challenge because the Marsh prayer did not violate this
nonsectarian maxim-'because the particular chaplain had 'removed all
references to Christ."' 85 The Fourth Circuit further maintained, "Thus,
we must reject the Town Council's contention that the Marsh Court's
approval of a nonsectarian prayer 'within the Judeo-Christian tradition'
equates to approval of prayers like those challenged here, which invoke
the exclusively Christian deity-Jesus Christ." 86
b. Simpson v. Chesterfield County Board of Supervisors
87In Simpson v. Chesterfield County Board of Supervisors, the
Fourth Circuit reiterated that Marsh authorizes only non-sectarian
prayers. Simpson upheld a County's practice of inviting religious
leaders to begin meetings with invocations because the County was
81. Id. at 297 (quoting Allegheny Cnty. v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 603 (1989)).
82. Id. (quoting Marsh, 463 U.S. at 794-95).
83. Id. (quoting Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 603).
84. Id. (quoting Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 603).
85. Id. at 299 (quoting Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 603 (quoting Marsh, 463 U.S. at
793 n.14)).
86. Id. at 300.
87. Simpson v. Chesterfield Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors, 404 F.3d 276 (4th Cir.
2005).
88. Id.
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found not to have advanced any one religion to the detriment of others.
Significantly, Chesterfield County's policy "track[ed] the language of
Marsh, stat[ing] that each 'invocation must be non-sectarian with
elements of the American civil religion and must not be used to
proselytize or advance any one faith or belief or to disparage any other
faith or belief."' 90
In Simpson, a county resident who was Wiccan sued the county
board of supervisors after the board excluded the plaintiff from a list of
local religious leaders available to provide non-sectarian prayers prior to
public sessions of the county board meetings. 91 Specifically, the plaintiff
challenged the board's practice of restricting potential prayer-givers to
representatives of Judeo-Christian and monotheistic religions.92 The
district court granted the plaintiffs motion for summary judgment on her
Establishment Clause claim, but the Fourth Circuit reversed. 93 In
reversing, the Fourth Circuit held that under Marsh, legislative prayers
are constitutionally acceptable when they fit broadly within the Judeo-
Christian tradition. 94 The Fourth Circuit focused on the substance of the
invocations themselves, rather than the selection of clergy. 95 In focusing
on the invocations, the court held that the Establishment Clause was not
violated because "there [was] no indication that the prayer opportunity
[was] exploited to proselytize or advance any one, or to disparage any
other, faith or belief."9 6 The court noted that the county, "seeking to
avoid the slightest hint of sectarianism, revised its invitation letter to the
clergy" and began directing clergy "to avoid invoking the name of Jesus
Christ." 97
The Simpson court rejected the plaintiffs argument that the
selection of clergy bore any constitutional significance, citing to the fact
that the Supreme Court in Marsh upheld a practice where the sole prayer-
89. Id. at 278.
90. Id. (emphasis added).
91. Id. at 280.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 280, 288.
94. Id. at 283.
95. Id. at 286.
96. Id. at 283 (quoting Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 794-95 (1983)).
97. Id. at 279.
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giver was a Presbyterian minister. Rather, the Fourth Circuit in
Simpson noted that what matters is the content of the prayer, not the
identity of the prayer-giver. According to the Simpson court, even
though Marsh means that "the Establishment Clause does not scrutinize
legislative invocations with the same rigor that it appraises other
religious activities," it does require "that a divine appeal be wide-
ranging, tying its legitimacy to common religious ground."'oo The Fourth
Circuit explained:
In private observances, the faithful surely choose to
express the unique aspects of their creeds. But in
their civic faith, Americans have reached more
broadly. Our civic faith seeks guidance that is not
the property of any sect. To ban all manifestations
of this faith would needlessly transform and
devitalize the very nature of our culture. When we
gather as Americans, we do not abandon all
expressions of religious faith. Instead, our
expressions evoke common and inclusive themes
and forswear, as Chesterfield has done, the
forbidding character of sectarian invocations.o
Simpson concluded that "the content of the invocations given at County
Board meetings has not 'crossed the constitutional line.'" 02 As clarified
in Simpson:
Wynne was concerned that repeated invocation of
the tenets of a single faith undermined our
commitment to participation by persons of all
faiths in public life. For ours is a diverse nation not
only in matters of secular viewpoint but also in
98. Id. at 285.
99. See id. at 286.
100. Id. at 287.
10 1. Id.
102. Id. at 284 (quoting Wynne v. Town of Great Falls, 376 F.3d 292, 298 (4th
Cir. 2004)); see also Wynne, 376 F.3d at 299 ("Regardless of the context or
applicable 'test,' one 'command of the Establishment Clause' is absolutely 'clear[]':
'one religious denomination cannot be officially preferred over another."' (quoting
Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 244 (1982) (alterations in the original) (emphasis
added))).
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matters of religious adherence. Advancing one
specific creed at the outset of each public meeting
runs counter to the credo of American pluralism
and discourages the diverse views on which our
democracy depends.103
In other words, Judge Wilkinson, in Simpson, emphasized the importance
of avoiding sectarianism in legislative prayer, in favor of striving for
more inclusiveness.
c. Turner v. City Council ofFredericksburg
The Fourth Circuit reaffirmed these principles in Turner v. City
Council of Fredericksburg,' 1 where it confronted a city council
member's claim that the Fredericksburg City Council violated the First
Amendment when it prohibited him from invoking Jesus' name during
opening invocations. o0 The district court in Turner ruled against the
council member, concluding that Supreme Court and Fourth Circuit
precedent require that legislative prayers be non-sectarian.10 6 Although
the council member attempted to distinguish Wynne as barring only
"frequent references to Jesus Christ to the exclusion of all other deities,"
but permitting "isolated references to Jesus,"' 07 the court rejected that
argument, explaining:
Councilor Turner's adaptation of Wynne, would
render the Establishment Clause inapplicable as
long as [sectarian] prayer did not exceed a certain
unspecified number or percentage of prayers.
Despite his suggestion, Wynne does not direct this
Court to conduct a quantitative analysis of the
number and percentage of references to a specific
deity. The Wynne court concluded that the
Christian prayers at issue violated the rule of
103. Simpson, 404 F.3d at 283.
104. 534 F.3d 352 (4th Cir. 2008).
105. Id. at 353.
106. Turner v. City Council of Fredericksburg, No. 3:06CV23, 2006 WL
2375715, at *1-3 (E.D. Va. Aug. 14, 2006).
107. Id. at *4.
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Marsh and Allegheny, by "affiliating" the
government with the Christian religion. Wynne did
not restrict the number of invocations, rather it
"enjoin[ed] the Town Council from invoking the
name of a specific deity associated with any one
specific faith or belief in prayers given at Town
Council meetings . . . " Councilor Turner's
invocations of the name of Jesus Christ, whether
they are sporadic or frequent violates the
prohibition against sectarian legislative prayer.'os
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit affirmed, holding that the City of
Fredericksburg's "decision to provide only nonsectarian legislative
prayers places it squarely within the range of conduct permitted by
Marsh and Simpson." 
09
d. Joyner v. Forsyth County Board of Commissioners
With its recent opinion in Joyner, the Fourth Circuit has again
held that sectarian legislative prayers impermissibly advance one religion
over others in violation of the Establishment Clause. " Repeatedly citing
Marsh and Allegheny, as well as Simpson and Wynne, the court
emphasized the importance of the actual content of the prayers, noting
that "both the Supreme Court and this circuit have been careful to place
clear boundaries on invocations.""' The Fourth Circuit continued:
That is because prayer in governmental settings
carries risks. The proximity of prayer to official
government business can create an environment in
which the government prefers-or appears to
prefer-particular sects or creeds at the expense of
108. Id. at *4-5 (quoting Wynne v. Town of Great Falls, 376 F.3d 292, 302
(4th Cir. 2004)). See also Allegheny Cnty. v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 608 n.56 (1989)
(rejecting the notion that "temporary acts of favoritism for a particular sect do not
violate the Establishment Clause").
109. Turner, 534 F.3d at 356 ("The restriction that prayers be nonsectarian in
nature is designed to make the prayers accessible to people who come from a variety
of backgrounds, not to exclude or disparage a particular faith.").
110. Joyner v. Forsyth Cnty., 653 F.3d 341, 348 (4th Cir. 2011).
111. Id. at 347.
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others . . . . More broadly, while legislative prayer
has the capacity to solemnize the weighty task of
governance and encourage ecumenism among its
participants, it also has the potential to generate
sectarian strife. Such conflict rends communities
and does violence to the pluralistic and inclusive
values that are a defining feature of American
public life . . . . The cases thus seek to minimize
these risks by requiring legislative prayers to
embrace a non-sectarian ideal. That ideal is simply
this: that those of different creeds are in the end
kindred spirits, united by a respect paid higher
providence and by a belief in the importance of
religious faith.112
The court concluded that the December 17, 2007 prayer set forth in the
introduction of this article "clearly crossed the constitutional line."ll 3
Citing to prayers found unconstitutional in Wynne, which "ended with a
solitary reference to Jesus Christ," the court noted that "[t]he prayer here
went further." 1 l4 The court concluded that the prayer on December 17,
2007 was "hardly unusual," highlighting that "[a]lmost four-fifths of the
prayers" contained sectarian references.15
The court rejected the County's argument that its policy was
neutral and therefore its practice was constitutional.116 The court stated,
"Take-all-comers policies that do not discourage sectarian prayer will
inevitably favor the majoritarian faith in the community at the expense of
religious minorities living therein." Consequently, the Fourth Circuit
concluded that the County's policy "falls short."
112. Id.
113. Id. at 349.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 353 (noting that it is not enough "when the County was not in any
way proactive in discouraging sectarian prayer in public settings").
117. Id. at 354.
118. Id.
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2. Case Law Outside of the Fourth Circuit
Many other courts around the country have disallowed all
sectarian references in legislative prayers. In Hinrichs v. Bosma,119 the
Seventh Circuit declined to stay the district court's ruling that found that
the Indiana House of Representatives violated the Establishment Clause
by permitting opening legislative prayers that "repeatedly and
consistently advance the beliefs that define the Christian religion: the
resurrection and divinity of Jesus of Nazareth."I20 This was the case even
though invocations were also given by a Jewish rabbi and a Muslim
imam.12' The court in Hinrichs emphasized the Supreme Court's
language in Marsh, which noted that the chaplain's prayers were
"nonsectarian."' 22 The Hinrichs court concluded that "we [read] Marsh
as hinging on the nonsectarian nature of the invocations at issue there." 23
The court found that a majority of the prayers given were "identifiably
Christian."' 24
Similarly, in Bacus v. Palo Verde Unified School District,'25 the
Ninth Circuit struck down a school board's practice of always beginning
its meetings with an invocation "in the name of Jesus."126 The Ninth
Circuit held that the prayers did not disparage other religious beliefs or
proselytize for Christianity, but they did "advance" Christianity and were
therefore improper.127
However, the Eleventh Circuit in Pelphrey v. Cobb Countyl28
upheld a prayer policy quite similar to the one struck down in Joyner.129
119. Hinrichs v. Bosma, 440 F.3d 393 (7th Cir. 2006), overruled by Hinrichs
v. Speaker of the H.R. of the Ind. Gen. Assemb., 506 F.3d 584, 585 (7th Cir. 2007)
(finding that the appellants lacked standing).
120. Hinrichs v. Bosma, 400 F. Supp. 2d 1103, 1104 (S.D. Ind. 2005).
121. Hinrichs, 440 F.3d at 395.
122. Id. at 398.
123. Id. at 399.
124. Id. at 395.
125. 52 F. App'x 355 (9th Cir. 2002).
126. Id. at 356-57.
127. Id. at 357.
128. 547 F.3d 1263 (11 th Cir. 2008).
129. See id. at 1266 (noting two county commissions had the "long tradition of
opening their meetings with a prayer offered by volunteer clergy or other members
of the community").
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Pelphrey is distinguishable from Joyner through the fact that, while a
majority of prayer-givers in Pelphrey were Christian and included
sectarian references in their prayers, leaders of several different faiths
had come forth and references to deities other than Jesus Christ were in
the record.130 Further, the Pelphrey opinion substantially relied' on a
single footnote in Snyder v. Murray.132 In that footnote, the Tenth
Circuit, in Snyder opined that because "all prayers 'advance' a particular
faith or belief in one way or another," the Establishment Clause prohibits
only the "more aggressive form of advancement, i.e., proselytization."l 33
In Wynne, however, the Fourth Circuit specifically rebuffed the Snyder
footnote, concluding that it rested on a misreading of Marsh:
Both [the] premise and conclusion are wrong. Not
"all prayers" "advance" a particular faith." Rather,
nonsectarian prayers, by definition, do not advance
a particular sect or faith. Moreover, as explained in
the text above, Marsh prohibits prayers that
"proselytize or advance" a particular faith, not just
prayers that proselytize a particular faith. Thus, we
find this statement from the Snyder court
unpersuasive, and inconsistent with the plain
language of Marsh.134
However, the majority in Joyner concluded that the Pelphrey court
"adopted the same approach we did in Wynne and Simpson: it determined
as a threshold matter whether the invocations exploited the opportunity
for legislative prayer."' 35 The Joyner court noted that advancement of a
particular faith "did not take place in Pelphrey, where the 'diverse
references in the prayers, viewed cumulatively, did not advance a single
faith."' 1 36 The Fourth Circuit in Joyner distinguished the invocations in
130. Id.
131. See id at 1273-74 (quoting Snyder v. Murray City Corp., 159 F.3d 1227,
1233-34, 1234 n.10 (10th Cir.1998) (en banc)).
132. 159 F.3d 1227.
133. Id. at 1234 n.10 (citing Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 793 n.14, 794-
95 (1983)).
134. Wynne v. Town of Great Falls, 376 F.3d 292, 301 n.6 (4th Cir. 2004).
135. Joyner v. Forsyth Cnty., 653 F.3d 341, 353 (4th Cir. 2011).
136. Id (quoting Pelphrey v. Cobb Cnty., 547 F.3d 1263, 1277 (11th Cir.
2008)).
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Pelphrey from those in Joyner because in the present case, "Almost four-
fifths of the prayers delivered after the adoption of the policy referenced
Jesus Christ. None of the prayers mentioned any other deity. And at no
time after the adoption of the policy did a non-Christian religious leader
come forth to give a prayer.",37
3. The Meaning of "Sectarian" Prayer
One issue that arises in legislative prayer cases is the meaning of
"sectarian" prayer. The Supreme Court recognized that authorizing
legislative prayers worked an exception in Establishment Clause
jurisprudence, which was justified only because of the "unique history"
of such prayers.138 To avoid trampling on the interests of religious
minorities, however, as explained in Allegheny, the Court has viewed this
exception as exceedingly narrow. 3 9 Excluding identifiably sectarian
invocations safeguards the appeal of legislative prayer as "wide-ranging,
tying its legitimacy to common religious ground." 4 0 And it ensures that
individuals of other faiths will not feel excluded by their own
government. 141
The term "sectarian" has been defined in various Supreme Court
and Fourth Circuit opinions.142 Further, the Fourth Circuit decisions on
137. Id. The dissent in Joyner concludes that the Joyner majority opinion and
Pelphrey are in "direct conflict." Id. at 364 (Niemeyer, J., dissenting).
138. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 791.
139. See Allegheny Cnty. v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 603-05 (1989).
140. Simpson v. Chesterfield Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors, 404 F.3d 276, 287 (4th
Cir. 2005) (citing Marsh, 463 U.S. at 786).
141. See Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 595 (rejecting "any notion that this Court will
tolerate some government endorsement of religion . . . [because] any endorsement
... 'sends a message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members of the
political community, and an accompanying message to adherents that they are
insiders, favored members of the political community."' (emphasis added) (quoting
Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring)))).
142. See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 588 (1992) (defining "sectarian"
prayer as one that "uses ideas or images identified with a particular religion").
Additionally, as Wynne noted:
The prayers sponsored by the Town Council have invoked a
deity in whose divinity only those of the Christian faith
believe. This is not a . . . 'nonsectarian prayer' without
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legislative prayer give guidance to cities and counties as to what
language crosses "the constitutional line."1 4 3 For example, in Wynne, the
Fourth Circuit affirmed a district court order enjoining a Town Council
"from invoking the name of a specific deity associated with any one
specific faith or belief in prayers given at Town Council meetings."'4 In
Simpson, this court acknowledged that the County's practice of directing
Christian clergy "to avoid invoking the name of Jesus Christ" met the
non-sectarian requirement.145 In Turner, the court authorized the city to
"continue its current practice of offering the official prayer to a non-
denominational 'God,' without invoking the name of a specifically
Christian (or other denominational) deity."l 4 6 Acknowledging and
barring these references does not violate the Supreme Court's warning
against "parsing" a prayer. 147Finally, there is a difference between the
terms "Christian" and "Judeo-Christian."
'explicit references . . . to Jesus Christ, or to a patron saint'
references that can 'foster a different sort of sectarian rivalry
than an invocation or benediction in terms more neutral.'
Wynne v. Town of Great Falls, 376 F.3d 297, 300 (4th Cir. 2004) (quoting Lee, 505
U.S. at 588, 589); see also Lee, 505 U.S. at 641 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (defining
sectarian prayer as one "specifying details upon which men and women who believe
in a benevolent, omnipotent Creator and Ruler of the world are known to differ (for
example, the divinity of Christ)").
143. Joyner v. Forsyth Cnty., 653 F.3d 341, 350 (4th Cir. 2011).
144. Wynne, 376 F.3d at 302 (internal quotation marks omitted).
145. Simpson, 404 F.3d at 279, 284.
146. Turner v. City Council of Fredericksburg, No. 3:06CV23, 2006 WL
2375715, at *5-4 (internal quotation marks omitted), aff'd, Turner v. City Council of
Fredericksburg, 534 F.3d 352 (4th Cir. 2008).
147. See Allegheny Cnty. v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 609 (1989) ("'[T]he
myriad, subtle ways in which Establishment Clause values can be eroded'
necessitates 'careful judicial scrutiny' of 'government practices that purport to
celebrate or acknowledge events with religious significance[.]"' (quoting Lynch v.
Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 694 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring)); Joyner, 653 F.3d at
352 (noting that, in Wynne, the court did not .'pars[e]' the details of particular
prayers" when noting the "frequency" of reference to Christian-specific deities);
Wynne, 376 F.3d at 298 n.4 (observing that "a recognition that the prayers often
included an invocation to Jesus Christ does not constitute the 'parsing' referred to in
Marsh").
148. See Joyner, 653 F.3d at 348 ("We found unpersuasive the council's
arguments that its references to Jesus Christ fell within Marsh's approval of a prayer
in the Judeo-Christian tradition, for the prayers referenced Christ-'a deity in whose
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B. Government Speech v. Private Speech
One of the common arguments proffered by advocates of
sectarian legislative prayer is that this type of prayer constitutes private
speech, protected by the free speech and free exercise clauses of the First
Amendment. The Fourth Circuit and all other courts to reach the issue
have concluded that prayers delivered by invited clergy at legislative
meetings are "government speech subject . . . to the proscriptions of the
Establishment Clause.,,149 Indeed, as noted by the Fourth Circuit in
Turner (in which Justice Sandra Day O'Connor was sitting by
designation), there is not "a single case in which legislative prayer was
treated as individual or private speech., 50 Indeed, even the cases outside
of the Fourth Circuit that rule differently on the constitutionality of all
divinity only those of the Christian faith believe."' (quoting Wynne, 376 F.3d at 299-
300)); Simpson, 404 F.3d at 286 (noting that "Judeo-Christian" refers to several
religious traditions and may even include Islam); Wynne, 376 F.3d at 299-300
(rejecting "the Town Council's contention that the Marsh Court's approval of a
nonsectarian prayer 'within the Judeo-Christian tradition' equates to approval of
prayers like those challenged here, which invoke the exclusively Christian deity-
Jesus Christ").
149. Simpson, 404 F.3d at 288 (internal quotation marks omitted).
150. Turner, 534 F.3d at 355. In the trial court's opinion in Joyner, Magistrate
Judge Sharp noted:
The Court concludes . . . that binding Fourth Circuit precedent
presents a formidable obstacle for Defendant in its attempt to
establish that legislative prayer is private speech. In Turner [],
the court of appeals noted that the plaintiff had not "cited a
single case in which a legislative prayer was treated as
individual or private speech.
Joyner v. Forsyth Cnty., No. 1:07CV243, 2009 WL 3787754, at *5 (M.D.N.C. Nov.
9, 2009); see also Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 600 (noting that "the Establishment Clause
does not limit only the religious content of the government's own communications"
but also "prohibits the government's support and promotion of religious
communications by religious organizations"); Simpson, 404 F.3d at 288 (holding
that legislative prayers constitute government speech-even when given by
community members rather than government officials-because the purpose of the
invocations "is simply that of a brief pronouncement of simple values presumably
intended to solemnize the [government meeting and is] not intended for the
exchange of views or other public discourse [or] for the exercise of one's religion").
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sectarian legislative prayer consistently view legislative prayer as
government-sponsored speech. 5 1
Courts often employ a four-factor test to determine whether
speech at issue is government speech, as opposed to private speech,
analyzing:
(1) the central purpose of the program in which the
speech in question occurs; (2) the degree of
editorial control exercised by the government or
private entities over the content; (3) the identity of
the literal speaker; and (4) whether the government
or the private entity bears the ultimate
responsibility for the content of the speech.152
With regard to the first factor, in Joyner, the County conceded that the
purpose of the prayers was to "solemnize proceedings of the Forsyth
County Board of Commissioners.",53 The prayers were offered after the
Board and the citizens formally gathered together for the meeting, the
Chair invited the audience to stand for both the invocation and the Pledge
of Allegiance, and the prayer was included on the official County
recording of the meeting.154
With regard to the second factor, i.e., the degree of editorial
control exercised by the government or private entities over the content
of the speech, the prayer-givers in Joyner were invited by the Board to
pray on their behalf.55 Further, the Policy required that the Board
determine who offered prayers at the beginning of its meetings, and not
151. See, e.g., Pelphrey v. Cobb Cnty., 547 F.3d 1263, 1275 (11th Cir. 2008)
("The prayers of the commissions are governed by Marsh."); Doe #2 v. Tangipahoa
Parish Sch. Bd., 631 F. Supp.2d 823, 835 (E.D. La. 2009) (explaining that Marsh
provided the pertinent standard because it is applicable to all "government-sponsored
prayer in opening legislative sessions").
152. Turner, 534 F.3d at 354 (internal quotation marks omitted).
153. Joint Appendix, supra note 2, at 169 1; Joyner, 2009 WL 3787754, at
*5.
154. Joint Appendix, supra note 2, at 146 29, 169 1-2, 195-99, 220-22,
232-36, 298-99, 311-12; Joyner, 2009 WL 3787754, at *2, 5; see also Turner, 534
F.3d at 354 (noting that the first factor weighs in favor of government speech where
the prayer is delivered at the opening of the meeting along with the Pledge of
Allegiance after the prayer-giver is called on by the Mayor).
155. Joint Appendix, supra note 2, at 206, 286, 299-300; Joyner, 2009 WL
3787754, at *2, 5.
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everyone requesting access is included automatically on the
Congregations List. Indeed, the County has made clear that only
religious leaders from established congregations will be permitted to
offer prayer.
With regard to the third factor, the Fourth Circuit in Simpson
concluded that the practice of inviting outside prayer-givers did not
convert legislative prayer into private speech.157 Finally, under the fourth
factor, the government retains the ultimate responsibility for the content
of the speech in question. For example, in Joyner, at the time the prayer
was offered, an uninvited speaker would not have been permitted to take
the microphone and begin speaking about any issue-such a speaker
would have been asked to sit down.'5 8 Consequently, "[a]fter considering
these factors, the Court conclude[d] that [Forsyth County's] invocation
prayers [we]re government speech." 5 9
III. CONCLUSION
As noted by the Fourth Circuit, Forsyth County's prayer policy
"resulted in sectarian invocations meeting after meeting that advanced
Christianity and that made at least two citizens feel uncomfortable,
unwelcome, and unwilling to participate in the public affairs of Forsyth
County.',16 The court elaborated:
156. Joint Appendix, supra note 2, at 201-06, 217-18, 353-55.
157. Simpson v. Chesterfield Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors, 404 F.3d 276, 288 (4th
Cir. 2005).
158. Joint Appendix, supra note 2, at 206, 286, 299-300; see also, Hinrichs v.
Bosma, 400 F. Supp.2d 1103, 1114 (S.D. Ind. 2005), overruled by Hinrichs v.
Speaker of the H.R. of the Ind. Gen. Assemb., 506 F.3d 584, 599-600 (7th Cir.
2007) (finding that the appellants lacked standing and holding that prayers offered at
the beginning of sessions of the Indiana legislature were government speech, even
though they were frequently given by clergy having no government connection,
where the Speaker of the House controlled access to the podium and had denied the
intent to create any kind of public forum); Simpson, 404 F.3d at 288 (finding that the
prayers given by invited outside prayer-givers constituted government speech where
the purpose of the invocation "is not intended for the exchange of views or other
public discourse").
159. Joyner, 2009 WL 3787754, at *5.
160. Joyner v. Forsyth Cnty., 653 F.3d 341, 354 (4th Cir. 2011).
328 FIRST AMENDMENT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 10
2012] SECTARIAN LEGISLATIVE PRAYER
To be sure, citizens in a robust democracy should
expect to hear all manner of things that they do not
like. But the First Amendment teaches that
religious faith stands on a different footing from
other forms of speech and observance. Because
religious belief is so intimate and so central to our
being, government advancement and effective
endorsement of one faith carries a particular sting
for citizens who hold devoutly to another. This is
precisely the opposite of what legislative
invocations should bring about. In other words,
whatever the Board's intentions, its policy, as
implemented, has led to exactly the kind of
"divisiveness the Establishment Clause rightly
seeks to avoid."' 6 1
In so holding the Fourth Circuit in Joyner v. Forsyth County confirmed
what most courts in the country have concluded-that sectarian
legislative prayer is unconstitutional under the First Amendment to the
United States Constitution. The Supreme Court's denial of certiorari
underscores the finality and consistency of this conclusion.
161. Id. at 354-55 (quoting Simpson, 404 F.3d at 284).
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